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Abstract
We find the minimum probability of lifetime ruin of an investor who can invest in a
market with a risky and a riskless asset and who can purchase a reversible life annuity.
The surrender charge of a life annuity is a proportion of its value. Ruin occurs when
the total of the value of the risky and riskless assets and the surrender value of the
life annuity reaches zero. We find the optimal investment strategy and optimal annuity
purchase and surrender strategies in two situations: (i) the value of the risky and riskless
assets is allowed to be negative, with the imputed surrender value of the life annuity
keeping the total positive; or (ii) the value of the risky and riskless assets is required to
be non-negative. In the first case, although the individual has the flexiblity to buy or sell
at any time, we find that the individual will not buy a life annuity unless she can cover all
her consumption via the annuity and she will never sell her annuity. In the second case,
the individual surrenders just enough annuity income to keep her total assets positive.
However, in this second case, the individual’s annuity purchasing strategy depends on the
size of the proportional surrender charge. When the charge is large enough, the individual
will not buy a life annuity unless she can cover all her consumption, the so-called safe
level. When the charge is small enough, the individual will buy a life annuity at a wealth
lower than this safe level.
Key words. Life annuities, retirement, optimal investment, stochastic control, free-
boundary problem
1 Introduction
The so-called “annuity puzzle” is that in financial markets for which annuity purchase is not
mandatory, the volume of voluntary purchases by retirees is much smaller than predicted by
models, such as those proposed by Yaari [1965], Richard [1975] and Davidoff et al. [2005].
Although life annuities provide income security in retirement, very few retirees choose a
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life annuity over a lump sum. According to a recent survey exploring attitudes towards
annuitization among individuals approaching retirement in the United Kingdom by Gardner
and Wadsworth [2004], over half of the individuals in the sample chose not to annuitize given
the option. Whether the option was 100% annuitization or only partial (50%) annuitization,
the attitude was the same. The dominant reason given for not wanting to annuitize in the
survey is the preference for flexibility. It is well known that annuity income is not reversible.
In other words, annuity holders can neither surrender for a refund nor short-sell (borrow
against) their earlier purchased annuities, even when such a deal is desirable.
In this paper, we explore a way to add flexibility to life annuities by proposing a financial
innovation, specifically a reversible annuity, an immediate life annuity with a surrender op-
tion. The option to surrender allows an annuity holder to either borrow against or surrender
any portion of her annuities at any time when she is still alive. The purchase value of this
reversible annuity is determined by the expected present value of future payments to the an-
nuity holder, which follows the same principle as regular annuities. The surrender value is set
as a fixed proportion of its purchase value at the time of surrendering. The surrender value
can also be viewed as the purchasing value less a proportional surrender charge, which is a
combination of transaction cost, operating charge, and compensation for adverse selection.
To explore how this reversible annuity would work for retirees as a reliable flow of income, as
well as an asset able to be surrendered under certain personal circumstance, we investigate
the optimal investment strategy and optimal annuity purchase and surrender strategies for
an individual who seeks to minimize the probability that she outlives her wealth, also called
the probability of lifetime ruin. In other words, we assume that the retiree consumes at a
exogenous level, and we determine the optimal investment strategy, as well as the optimal
time to annuitize or to surrender, in order to minimize the probability that wealth will reach
zero before her death.
As a risk metric, the probability of lifetime ruin is widely used to investigate optimiza-
tion problems faced by retirees in a financial market. This metric was first introduced by
Milevsky and Robinson [2000] in a static environment and was extended by Young [2004] to
a stochastic environment without immediate life annuities. A recent paper by Milevsky et al.
[2006] determined the optimal dynamic investment policy for an individual who consumes
at a specific rate, who invests in a complete financial market, and who can buy irreversible
immediate life annuities. Milevsky, Moore, and Young show that the individual will not an-
nuitize any of her wealth until she can fully cover her desired consumption with an immediate
life annuity. Additionally, Bayraktar and Young [2009] investigate the optimal strategy for an
retiree in a financial market with deferred (not immediate) life annuities. Within the topic of
minimizing probability of lifetime ruin in a complete financial market without life annuities,
Bayraktar et al. [2008] consider the case for which the exogenous consumption is random,
and in Bayraktar and Young [2008], consumption is ratcheted (that is, it is a non-decreasing
function of maximum wealth). Bayraktar and Young [2007] investigate the optimal strategy
when consumption level is deterministic but borrowing is constrained.
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In contrast to the literature mentioned above, we allow an individual not only to buy
an immediate life annuity, but also to surrender existing immediate life annuities with a
proportional surrender charge. This reversibility of life annuities and the incompleteness
of the annuity market (due to the proportional surrender charge) creates a more complex
optimization environment and makes the problem mathematically challenging. Our model
can be viewed as a generalization of the model by Milevsky et al. [2006] in which annuities are
irreversible, and the limiting case for which the surrender value of existing annuity approaches
zero is consistent with their study.
Our work is the first to investigate the optimal strategies for a retiree in a market with
reversible immediate life annuities. We comprehensively analyze the annuitization and invest-
ment strategies for such a retire. We focus on how the proportional surrender charge, which
ranges from 0% to 100% of the purchasing value of annuity, affects an individual’s optimal
strategies. We predict that, when the surrender charge is low enough, the individual has
incentive to annuitize partially. This distinguishes our model from the one with irreversible
annuities, in which an individual is only willing to fully annuitize. This difference shows that
the flexibility offered by reversible annuities might be able to resolve the “annuity puzzle.”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the financial
market in which the individual invests her wealth. In addition to investing in riskless and
risky assets, the individual can purchase reversible immediate life annuities. In Section 3,
we consider the life annuity as part of her total wealth, thereby allowing her assets to have
negative value as long as the imputed surrender value of her annuity makes her total wealth
positive. We prove a verification theorem for the minimal probability of lifetime ruin in this
case, and we obtain the minimal probability, along with optimal investment and annuitization
strategies. In Section 4, we consider the case for which individual is forced to keep the value
of her riskless and risky assets non-negative (excluding the surrender value of the annuity) by
surrendering the annuity when needed. It turns out that the optimal annuitization strategy
depends on the size of the proportional surrender charge. We consider the case when the
charge is large in Section 4.2.1, and in Section 4.2.2, we discuss the case when the charge is
small.
2 Minimizing the Probability of Lifetime Ruin
In this section, we describe the financial market in which the individual can invest her wealth,
and we formulate the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin in this market.
We allow the individual to purchase and surrender her reversible life annuity at any time.
2.1 Financial model
We consider an individual with future lifetime described by the random variable τd. Suppose
τd is an exponential random variable with parameter λ
S , also referred to as the force of
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mortality or hazard rate; in particular, E[τd] = 1/λS . The superscript S indicates that the
parameter equals the individual’s subjective belief as to the value of her hazard rate.
We assume that the individual consumes wealth at a constant rate of c ≥ 0; this rate might
be given in real or nominal units. One can interpret c as the minimum net consumption level
below which the individual cannot (or will not) reduce her consumption further; therefore,
the minimum probability of lifetime ruin gives a lower bound for the probability of ruin under
any consumption function bounded below by c.
The individual can invest in a riskless asset, which earns interest at the constant rate
r ≥ 0. Also, she can invest in a risky asset whose price satisfies
dSt = µSt dt+ σ St dBt, S0 = S > 0, (2.1)
in which µ > r, σ > 0, and B is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration
F = {Ft} of a probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that B is independent of τd, the
random time of death of the individual. If c is given as a real rate of consumption (that is,
inflation adjusted), then we also express r and µ as real rates.
Moreover, an individual can buy any amount of reversible immediate life annuity or
surrender any portion of her existing annuity income and receive some fraction of its value.
The purchase price of an immediate life annuity that pays $1 per year continuously until the
insured’s death is given by
a¯ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rse−λ
Os ds =
1
r + λO
, (2.2)
in which λO > 0 is the constant objective hazard rate that is used to price annuities. In other
words, in return for each $a the individual pays for an immediate life annuity, she receives
$1 per year of continuous annuity income until she dies.
Due to the reversibility of the life annuity, she can surrender any amount of the annuity
she owns. The surrender value for $1 of annuity income is (1 − p)a with 0 < p ≤ 1. The
factor p is the proportional surrender charge. In other words, the individual can get $(1−p)a
dollars from the issuer by giving up $1 of annuity income. Notice that the surrender value is
less than the purchase price, and the difference is the surrender charge (in dollars).
Let Wt denote the amount of wealth the individual has invested in the risky and riskless
assets at time t, with pit in the risky asset and Wt − pit in the riskless. Let A+t denote the
cumulative amount of annuity income bought on or before time t, and let A−t denote the
cumulative amount of annuity income surrendered on or before time t. Then, At = A
+
t −A−t
represents the cumulative amount of immediate life annuity income at time t. The investment
and annuitization strategy {pit, At}t≥0 is said to be admissible if the processes {pit}t≥0 and
{A±t }t≥0 are adapted to the filtration F, if
∫ t
0 pi
2
s ds < ∞, almost surely, for all t ≥ 0, and
if At ≥ 0, almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. The wealth dynamics of the individual for a given
4
admissible strategy are given by
dWt = [rWt−+(µ−r)pit−−c+At−]dt+σpit−dBt−a¯dA+t +a¯(1−p)dA−t , W0 = w ≥ 0. (2.3)
By “lifetime ruin,” we mean that the individual’s wealth reaches the line w = −(1−p)a¯A
before she dies. We denote the time of ruin by τ0 , {t ≥ 0 : W pi,At + (1 − p)a¯Api,At ≤ 0}. In
Section 3, we allow wealth (namely, the value of the riskless and risky assets) to be negative
with the individual effectively borrowing against her annuity income. Then, in Section 4, we
require that wealth remain non-negative. Note that τ0 is independent of τd. The minimum
probability of lifetime ruin ψ for the individual at time 0 is defined by
ψ(w,A) , inf
{pit,At}
P
[
τ0 < τd
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0] . (2.4)
Remark 2.1 Notice that because we assume that the hazard rates λS and λO, as well as the
financial parameters r, µ, and σ, are constant, ψ only depends on the state variables w and
A and not upon time.
Remark 2.2 We can derive an equivalent form for the minimum probability of ruin due to
the independence of the τd from τ0 :
ψ(w,A) = inf
{pit,At}
P
[
τ0 < τd
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0]
= inf
{pit,At}
E
[∫ ∞
0
λSe−λ
St 1{0≤τ0≤t} dt
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0]
= inf
{pit,At}
E
[∫ ∞
τ0
λSe−λ
St dt
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0]
= inf
{pit,At}
E
[
e−λ
Sτ0
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0] . (2.5)
We will use this expression in our proof of verification theorem in next section.
Remark 2.3 Milevsky et al. [2006] show that if one only allows irreversible life annuities,
then the individual will not buy a life annuity until her wealth is large enough to cover all
her consumption. Specifically, if w ≥ (c−A)a, then it is optimal for the individual to spend
(c − A)a to buy an immediate annuity that will pay at the continuous rate c − A for the
rest of her life. This income, together with the prior income of A, will cover her desired
consumption rate of c. In this case, the individual will not ruin, under the convention that
if her net consumption rate becomes c, then she is not considered ruined even if her wealth
is 0. (The latter occurs if her wealth is identically (c − A)a immediately before buying the
annuity.)
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3 NO BORROWING RESTRICTION
In this section, we consider the case in which the individual’s wealth w is allowed to be
negative, as long as w+ (1− p)a¯A is positive. Effectively, the individual is allowed to borrow
against her life annuity income.
3.1 Motivation for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Variational Inequality
Let us first consider the strategies one can choose to minimize the probability of ruin. Before
ruin occurs or the individual dies, she can execute one or more of the following strategies:
(i) purchase additional annuity income, (ii) surrender existing annuity income, or (iii) do
neither.
Now, suppose that at point (w,A), it is optimal not to purchase or surrender any annuity
income. In this case, we expect ψ will satisfy the equation
λSψ = (rw − c+A)ψw + min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
. (3.1)
Because the above policy is in general suboptimal, (3.1) holds as an inequality; that is, for
all (w,A),
λSψ ≤ (rw − c+A)ψw + min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
. (3.2)
As we shall prove later, no continuous purchase of lifetime annuity income is optimal;
that is, the problem of purchasing or surrendering annuity is one of singular control. Thus,
if at the point (w,A), it is optimal to purchase annuity income instantaneously, then the
individual moves instantly from (w,A) to (w − a¯∆A,A + ∆A), for some ∆A > 0. The
optimality of this decision implies that
ψ(w,A) = ψ(w − a¯∆A,A+ ∆A), (3.3)
which in turn yields
a¯ψw(w,A) = ψA(w,A). (3.4)
Similarly, if it is optimal to surrender annuity income at the point (w,A), the following
equation holds:
ψ(w,A) = ψ(w + (1− p)a¯∆A,A−∆A), (3.5)
which implies
(1− p)a¯ψw(w,A) = ψA(w,A). (3.6)
Notice that the surrender value is a portion of the value of annuity determined by the pro-
portional surrender charge p.
In general, such purchasing or surrendering policies are suboptimal; therefore, (3.4) and
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(3.6) hold as inequalities and become
a¯ψw(w,A) ≤ ψA(w,A), (3.7)
and
(1− p)a¯ψw(w,A) ≥ ψA(w,A). (3.8)
Because the individual will either buy additional annuity income, surrender existing annuity
income, or neither, we expect that the probability of lifetime ruin is a solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) variational inequality
max
{
λSψ − (rw − c+A)ψw −min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
,
a¯ψw(w,A)− ψA(w,A), ψA(w,A)− (1− p)a¯ψw(w,A)
}
= 0.
(3.9)
Define ws(A) ,
pc
1
a¯ − (1− p)r
− a¯A, in which A is the existing annuity income. At the
point (ws(A), A), suppose an individual borrows w˜(A) ,
(c−A)a¯− ws(A)
1− ra¯ at the interest
rate r. She, then, has wealth ws(A) + w˜(A), which she spends to buy
1
a¯
(ws(A) + w˜(A))
additional life annuity income. Therefore, the total annuity income she has is A+
1
a¯
(ws(A)+
w˜(A)) = rw˜(A)+c, which is just enough to cover the interest for the debt and the consumption
and thereby ensure that lifetime ruin is impossible. Note that ws(A) is the minimum required
wealth to execute this strategy, so we call it the safe level for the case in which we allow wealth
w to be negative. If asset and annuity income initially satisfy w ≥ ws(A), then the individual
will immediately execute this strategy to guarantee that her probability of lifetime ruin is
zero. It follows that
ψ(w,A) = 0, (3.10)
for w ≥ ws(A).
Recall that ruin occurs when w + (1− p)a¯A ≤ 0, from which it follows that
ψ(w,A) = 1, (3.11)
for w ≤ w(A) , −(1− p)a¯A.
The two boundaries ws(A) and w(A) meet at A =
c
1− (1− p)ra¯ > 0 as in Figure 1.
Thus, it remains to solve the minimum probability of ruin in the region
D ,
{
(w,A) : w(A) ≤ w ≤ ws(A), 0 ≤ A < c
1− (1− p)ra¯
}
.
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3.2 Verification Theorem
The discussion in Section 3.1 motivates the following verification theorem:
Theorem 3.1 For any pi ∈ R, define the functional operator Lpi through its action on a test
function f by
Lpif = [rw + (µ− r)pi − c+A]fw + 1
2
σ2pi2fww − λSf, (3.12)
Let v = v(w,A) be a non-increasing, non-negative, convex function of w that is twice-
differentiable with respect to w, except possibly at w = ws(A) where we assume that it has
right- and left-derivatives, and that is differentiable with respect to A. Suppose v satisfies the
following conditions on D:
1. Lpiv(w,A) ≥ 0 for any pi ∈ R.
2. avw(w,A)− vA(w,A) ≤ 0.
3. (1− p)avw(w,A)− vA(w,A) ≥ 0.
4. v(w(A), A) = 1, where w(A) is the lower boundary of wealth for the problem.
Then,
v(w,A) ≤ ψ(w,A), (3.13)
on D.
Proof: Suppose {pit} is an admissible investment strategy, and define τn , {t ≥ 0 :∫ t
0 pi
2
t dt ≥ n} and τ , τ0∧τn, which is a stopping time with respect to the filtration F. Then,
by using Itoˆ’s formula for semi-martingales, we can write
e−λ
Sτv(Wτ , Aτ ) = v(w,A) +
∫ τ
0
e−λ
Stvw(Wt, At)σ pitdBt +
∫ τ
0
e−λ
StLpitv(Wt, At)dt
+
∫ τ
0
e−λ
St [vA(Wt, At)− a¯vw(Wt, At)] d(A+t )(c)
+
∫ τ
0
e−λ
St [(1− p)a¯vw(Wt, At)− vA(Wt, At)] d(A−t )(c)
+
∑
0≤t≤τ
e−λ
St [v(Wt, At)− v(Wt−, At−)] .
(3.14)
Here, (A±)(c) is the continuous part of A±; that is,
(A±t )
(c) , A±t −
∑
0≤s≤t
(A±s −A±s−). (3.15)
Since v is non-increasing and convex in w, v2w(w,A) ≤ v2w(w(A), A) for w ≥ w(A). There-
fore,
E
[∫ τ
0
e−2λ
St v2w(Wt, At)σ
2 pi2t dt
∣∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A] <∞, (3.16)
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which implies that
E
[∫ τ
0
e−λ
St vw(Wt, At)σ pit dBt
∣∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A] = 0. (3.17)
By taking expectations of equation (3.14), as well as using (3.17) and Conditions 1, 2,
and 3 in the statement of the theorem, we obtain
E
[
e−λ
Sτv(Wτ , Aτ )
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A] ≥ v(w,A). (3.18)
In deriving (3.18), we also use the fact that∑
0≤t≤τ
e−λ
St [v(Wt, At)− v(Wt−, At−)] ≥ 0, (3.19)
because Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that v is non-decreasing in the direction of purchase and
surrender.
Since τn ↗∞ and v is bounded, applying the dominated convergence theorem to (3.18)
yields
E
[
e−λ
Sτ0v(Wτ0 , Aτ0)
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0] ≥ v(w,A). (3.20)
By using Assumption 4, one can rewrite (3.20) as
v(w,A) ≤ E
[
e−λ
Sτ0
∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0] . (3.21)
From this expression and from (2.5), we infer that
v(w,A) ≤ inf
{pit,At}
E
[
e−λ
Sτ0
∣∣∣∣W0 = w,A0 = A, τd > 0, τ0 > 0]
= ψ(w,A).
(3.22)

We will use the following corollary of Theorm 3.1 to determine ψ, the minimum probability
of ruin, along with an optimal investment and annuitization strategy.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose v satisfies the conditions in Theorem 3.1 and additionally is the
probability of ruin associated with an admissible strategy, then v = ψ on D and the associated
strategy is optimal.
3.3 Linearizing The Equation for ψ via Duality Arguments
We hypothesize that in the region D\{w = ws(A) or w = w(A)} as defined in Section 3.1, the
optimal strategy for minimizing the probability of ruin is neither to purchase nor to surrender
any life annuity income. In other words, the individual does not buy any additional annuity
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income until her wealth reaches the safe level ws(A), which is consistent with the results
of Milevsky et al. [2006]. Additionally, the individual never surrenders her annuity income.
Intuitively, this makes sense because we count the annuity income’s wealth equivalence in the
ruin level w(A) and thereby allow the individual to borrow against future annuity income
without actually forcing her to surrender the annuity.
Under this hypothesis, the first inequality in the HJB variational inequality (3.9) holds
with equality in the region D\{w = ws(A) or w = w(A)}, and the minimum probability of
ruin ψ is the solution to the following boundary-value problem (BVP)
λSψ = (rw − c+A)ψw + min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
, (3.23)
with the boundary conditions
ψ(w(A), A) = 1, (3.24)
and
ψ(ws(A), A) = 0. (3.25)
After solving this BVP, we will show that its solution satisfies the conditions of the Verification
Theorem 3.1 to verify our hypothesis.
To solve the BVP, we transform the nonlinear boundary value problem above into a linear
free-boundary problem (FBP) via the Legendre transform. Assume ψ(w,A) is convex with
respect to w, which we verify later; therefore, we can define the concave dual ψˆ of ψ by
ψˆ(y,A) = min
w≥w(A)
[ψ(w,A) + wy]. (3.26)
The critical value w∗(A) solves the equation ψw(w,A)+y = 0; thus, w∗ = I(−y,A), in which
I is the inverse of ψw with respect to w. It follows that
ψˆy(y,A) = I(−y,A), (3.27)
ψˆyy(y,A) = − 1
ψww(w,A)
∣∣∣∣∣
w=ψ−1w (−y,A)
, (3.28)
ψˆA(y,A) = ψA(w,A)
∣∣∣w=ψ−1w (−y,A), (3.29)
and
ψˆAy(y,A) = ψAw(w,A)ψˆyy(y,A)
∣∣∣w=ψ−1w (−y,A). (3.30)
Rewrite the differential equation (3.23) in terms of ψˆ to get
− λSψˆ − (r − λS)yψˆy +my2ψˆyy + y(c−A) = 0, (3.31)
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in which m =
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
. The general solution of (3.31) is
ψˆ(y,A) = D1(A)y
B1 +D2(A)y
B2 +
c−A
r
y, (3.32)
in which
B1,2 =
1
2m
(
(r − λS +m)±
√
(r − λS +m)2 + 4mλS
)
, (3.33)
with B1 > 1 and B2 < 0. It remains for us to determine the coefficients D1(A) and D2(A)
via the two boundary conditions.
To that end, consider the boundary conditions (3.24) and (3.25). Define
y(A) = −ψw(w(A), A), (3.34)
and
ys(A) = −ψw(ws(A), A). (3.35)
We will show later that ys(A) ≤ y(A), which is obvious if ψ is decreasing and convex with
respect to w. Then, for the free boundaries y(A) and ys(A), we obtain from (3.24) and (3.34)ψˆ(y(A), A) = ψ(w(A), A) + w(A)y(A) = 1− (1− p)a¯Ay(A),ψˆy(y(A), A) = w(A) = −(1− p)a¯A; (3.36)
and from (3.25) and (3.35)
ψˆ(ys(A), A) = ψ(ws(A), A) + ws(A)ys(A) =
(
pc
1
a¯ − (1− p)r
− a¯A
)
ys(A),
ψˆy(ys(A), A) = ws(A) =
pc
1
a¯ − (1− p)r
− a¯A.
(3.37)
Next, we find D1(A) and D2(A) along with y(A) and ys(A). To do so, we use the four
equations in (3.36) and (3.37) to find these four unknowns in terms of A. Substitute (3.32)
into (3.36) and (3.37) to get
D1(A)y(A)
B1 +D2(A)y(A)
B2 +
c−A
r
y(A) = 1− 1− p
r + λO
Ay(A), (3.38)
D1(A)B1y(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2y(A)B2−1 +
c−A
r
= − 1− p
r + λO
A, (3.39)
D1(A)ys(A)
B1 +D2(A)ys(A)
B2 +
c−A
r
ys(A) =
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
)
ys(A), (3.40)
and
D1(A)B1ys(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2ys(A)B2−1 +
c−A
r
=
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
. (3.41)
11
From (3.40) and (3.41), solve for D1(A) and D2(A) to obtain
D1(A) =
1−B2
B1 −B2
1
ys(A)
B1−1
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
− c−A
r
)
< 0, (3.42)
D2(A) =
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
1
ys(A)
B2−1
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
− c−A
r
)
< 0. (3.43)
Substituting D1(A) and D2(A) into (3.39) gives
− 1− p
r + λO
A =
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2 x(A)
B1−1
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
− c−A
r
)
+
B2(B1 − 1)
B1 −B2 x(A)
B2−1
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
− c−A
r
)
+
c−A
r
(3.44)
with x(A) , y(A)/ys(A) as a function of A.
With A fixed, (i) if x(A) = 1, the right-hand side of (3.44) equals
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
=
ws(A) > − 1− p
r + λO
A = w(A); (ii) if x(A)→ +∞, then the right-hand side of (3.44) approaches
−∞; and (iii) one can show that the right-hand side is strictly decreasing with respect to
x(A). Therefore, there exists a unique x(A) > 1 that satisfies equation (3.44).
Substitute for D1(A) and D2(A) into (3.38) to get
1
y(A)
=
c−A
r
+
1− p
r + λO
A+
(
pc
pr + λO
− A
r + λO
− c−A
r
)(
1−B2
B1 −B2x(A)
B1−1 +
B1 − 1
B1 −B2x(A)
B2−1
)
.
(3.45)
Then, by the definition of x(A), the solution for ys(A) is simply
ys(A) =
y(A)
x(A)
. (3.46)
Thus, we have solved the FBP given in (3.31), (3.36), and (3.37), and we state this formally
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 The solution of the FBP (3.31) with conditions (3.36) and (3.37) is given
by (3.32), with D1(A), D2(A), y(A), ys(A), and x(A) defined in (3.42), (3.43), (3.45), (3.46),
and (3.44), respectively.
Next, we determine some properties of ψˆ(y,A); in particular, we show that it is concave.
Also, notice that we can rewrite the inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) in terms of ψˆ as
ψˆA(y,A) ≥ − 1
r + λO
y, (3.47)
ψˆA(y,A) ≤ − 1− p
r + λO
y, (3.48)
for ys(A) ≤ y ≤ y(A), and we show below that these inequalities hold for our solution ψˆ.
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For notational simplicity, we drop the argument A in w(A), ws(A), y(A), and ys(A) in
much of the remainder of this subsection. By taking the derivative of (3.44) with respect to
A, we get(
ws − c−A
r
)
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
{
B1x(A)
B1−1 −B2x(A)B2−1
} dx(A)/dA
x(A)
=
(
1
r
− 1− p
r + λO
)
−
(
1
r
− 1
r + λO
) w − c−A
r
ws − c−A
r
.
(3.49)
It is easy to check that the right-hand side of the equation above is 0, which implies that
dx(A)
dA
= 0. (3.50)
In other words, x(A) = x is a constant, independent of A, and the equation (3.44) holds for
all A with the same value x > 1.
By taking the derivative of (3.45) and (3.46) with respect to A, we get
dys(A)
dA
= −ys(A) λ
O
r(r + λO)
1
ws(A)− c−A
r
. (3.51)
Also, after substituting for D1(A) and D2(A) in (3.32), we differentiate ψˆ(y,A) with respect
to A to get
ψˆA(y,A) = −y
{(
1
r + λO
− 1
r
)[
1−B2
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B1−1
+
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B2−1]
+
1
r
}
− dys(A)
dA
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
ws(A)− c−A
r
)[(
y
ys
)B1
−
(
y
ys
)B2]
.
(3.52)
Proposition 3.2 ψˆ(y,A) given by Proposition 3.1 is concave with respect to y and satisfies
inequalities (3.47) and (3.48).
Proof: First, it is straightforward to show the positivity of y(A) from (3.45). This
confirms that y(A) = ys(A)x > ys(A) > 0 because x > 1. It follows that ψˆ(y,A) is concave
with respect to y since both D1(A) < 0 and D2(A) < 0, and both B1(B1 − 1) > 0 and
B2(B2 − 1) > 0.
To prove the inequalities, we first substitute (3.51) into (3.52) to get
ψˆA(y,A) = y
λO
r(r + λO)
[
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B1−1
+
(B1 − 1)B2
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B2−1]
− y
r
, (3.53)
Substitute the expression for ψˆA(w,A) from (3.53) into inequalities (3.47) and (3.48) to obtain
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the equivalent inequalities
1 ≥ r + λ
O
r
− λ
O
r
[
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B1−1
+
(B1 − 1)B2
B1 −B2
(
y
ys
)B2−1]
≥ 1− p. (3.54)
Notice that the first inequality holds with equality if y = ys(A) and the second inequality
holds with equality if y = y(A). Define the auxiliary function
f(z) =
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2 z
B1−1 +
(B1 − 1)B2
B1 −B2 z
B2−1, (3.55)
which is increasing for 1 =
ys(A)
ys(A)
≤ z ≤ y(A)
ys(A)
= x. Indeed, in this interval,
f ′(z) =
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[
B1z
B1−2 −B2zB2−2
]
> 0. (3.56)
It follows that, for ys(A) ≤ y ≤ y(A), the inequality (3.54), and equivalently (3.47) and (3.48)
hold. 
In the next section, we rely on the work in this section to show that the convex dual of
ψˆ(y,A) equals the minimum probability of ruin ψ(w,A).
3.4 Relation Between the FBP and the Minimum Probability of Ruin
In this section, we show that the Legendre transform of the solution to the FBP given in
(3.31), (3.36), and (3.37) is in fact the minimum probability of ruin ψ. Since ψˆ is concave
from Propostion 3.2, we can define its convex dual via the Legendre transform for w ≥ w(A)
as
Ψ(w,A) = max
y≥0
[ψˆ(y,A)− wy]. (3.57)
Given A, the critical value y∗ solves the equation ψˆy(y,A) − w = 0. Thus y∗(A) = I(w,A),
in which I is the inverse of ψˆy. In this case, we also have expressions similar to those in
(3.27)-(3.30).
Given ψˆ, we proceed to find the boundary-value problem that Ψ solves. In the partial
differential equation for ψˆ in (3.31), let y = I(w,A) = −Ψw(w,A) to obtain
λSΨ(w,A) = (rw − c)Ψw(w,A)−m Ψ
2
w(w,A)
Ψww(w,A)
. (3.58)
Notice that we can rewrite (3.58) as
min
pi
LpiΨ = 0, (3.59)
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with the minimizing strategy pi∗ given in feedback form by
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
Ψw(w,A)
Ψww(w,A)
. (3.60)
Therefore, Ψ satisfies Condition 1 in Verification Theorem 3.1.
Next, consider the boundary conditions for (3.31). First, the boundary conditions at
ys(A), namely ψˆ(ys(A), A) = ws(A)ys(A) and ψˆy(ys(A), A) = ws(A), imply that the corre-
sponding dual value of w is ws(A) and that
Ψ(ws(A), A) = 0. (3.61)
Similarly, the boundary conditions at y(A), namely ψˆ(y(A), A) = 1+w(A)y(A) and ψˆy(y(A), A) =
w(A), imply that the corresponding dual value of w is w(A) and that
Ψ(w(A), A) = 1. (3.62)
Finally, Propostion 3.2 implies that
a¯Ψw(w,A)−ΨA(w,A) ≤ 0, (3.63)
and
(1− p)a¯Ψw(w,A)−ΨA(w,A) ≥ 0. (3.64)
Therefore, Ψ(w,A) satisfies Conditions 2 and 3 in Theorem 3.1.
From Ψw(w,A) = −y∗(A) and the fact that y ≥ ys(A) > 0, Ψ(w,A) is decreasing with
respect to w, and consequently 0 ≤ Ψ(w,A) ≤ 1 for (w,A) ∈ D due to (3.61) and (3.62).
Thus, Ψ is the minimum probability of ruin by Corollary 3.1, and we state this formally in
the next theorem.
Theorem 3.2 The minimum probability of ruin ψ(w,A) for (w,A) ∈ D, in which D is
defined by D =
{
(w,A) : w(A) ≤ w ≤ ws(A), 0 ≤ A < c
1− (1− p) r
r+λO
}
equals Ψ(w,A) in
(3.57). The associated optimal annuitization and investment strategies are given by
1. never to surrender existing annuity income;
2. to purchase additional annuity income only when wealth reaches ws(A), the safe level;
3. for w ∈ D\{w = ws(A) or w = w(A)}, to invest the following amount of wealth in the
risky asset:
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
ψw(w,A)
ψww(w,A)
.
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3.5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to demonstrate the results of Section 3.4.
We calculate the probabilities of lifetime ruin ψ(w,A), as well as the associated investment
strategies pi∗(w,A) for different values of the existing annuity income A and the surrender
charge p. We use the following values of the parameters for our calculation:
• λS = λO = 0.04; the hazard rate is such that the expected future lifetime is 25 years.
• r = 0.02; the riskless rate of return is 2% over inflation.
• µ = 0.06; the drift of the risky asset is 6% over inflation.
• σ = 0.20; the volatility of the risky asset is 20%.
• c = 1; the individual consumes one unit of wealth per year.
We focus on how the surrender penalty affects the probability of ruin and the optimal
investment strategy.
Figures 2-5 show the ruin probability ψ(w,A) and the associated optimal investment
pi∗(w,A) in the risky asset with the parameters described above, as well as with values for A
and p as indicated in the figures. Each curve gives values from w = w(A) to w = ws(A), in
which w(A) and ws(A) vary with respect to A and p. This is the reason why each curve lies
in a distinct domain. From the figures, we can see that the proved properties are verified in
these examples: the probability of ruin is decreasing and convex with respect to w. We also
observe that investment in the risky asset increases as wealth increases for each case.
4 BORROWING RESTRICTION
In this section, we consider the case in which the individual is forced to keep her wealth non-
negative by surrendering the life annuity when needed. With this restriction, the situation is
different from the one we studied in the previous section because in this section, the individual
cannot borrow against future life annuity income. It is reasonable to apply this restriction
because if the individual were to die, then the annuity income ceases. Therefore, if the
individual were to borrow against future annuity income and die, there might be insufficient
assets available to pay the debt.
Therefore, ruin occurs when both an individual’s annuity income A and wealth w are 0
since she has no more annuity income to surrender to raise her wealth. It follows that τ0 in
this case reduces to the hitting time of (w,A) = (0, 0) because on the line w = −(1− p)a¯A,
(0, 0) is the only point at which wealth w is non-negative. Notice that the probability of
lifetime ruin is not 1 when wealth reaches 0 if an individual still has existing annuity income,
which differs from the case of irreversible annuities.
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4.1 HJB Variational Inequality and Verification Theorem
As the preceding case without a borrowing restriction, we have the same HJB variational
inequality because the individual still has only three options to minimize the probability of
ruin: purchasing additional annuity income, surrendering existing annuity income, and doing
neither. Suboptimality of each strategy, in general, is represented by an inequality, while
the optimality of one’s executed strategy at all time requires that at least one of the three
inequalities holds as an equality.
We need only consider when A < c; otherwise the individual already has enough annuity
income to cover her consumption and lifetime ruin is impossible. In this case, the safe level
is given by ws(A) , (c−A)a¯. When the individual’s wealth reaches the safe level, she is able
to purchase (c − A) of additional annuity income and, thereby, ensure that lifetime ruin is
impossible. Therefore, we have the condition
ψ(ws(A), A) = 0. (4.1)
Notice that, for a given existing annuity income A, more wealth is needed to reach the safe
level if borrowing against the annuity is not allowed; that is, ws(A) in this section is greater
than ws(A) in the previous section.
When the individual’s wealth reaches 0, she is forced to surrender her life annuity to
keep her wealth non-negative. In this case, an annuitization strategy {At} is admissible
if the associated wealth process Wt ≥ 0. almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. Inspired by the
optimal annuitization strategy obtained in Theorem 3.2 for the case in which borrowing
is not restricted, we hypothesize that the individual will only surrender enough annuity
income to keep wealth non-negative. This means that on the boundary w = 0, she executes
instantaneous control, so we expect the following Neumann condition:
(1− p)a¯ψw(0, A) = ψA(0, A). (4.2)
Moreover, if both her wealth and annuity income are 0, ruin occurs; that is,
ψ(0, 0) = 1. (4.3)
Therefore, we need to solve for ψ(w,A) in the region D , {(w,A) : 0 ≤ w ≤ ws(A), 0 ≤
A < c}. Notice that the safe level ws(A) = (c−A)a¯ is different from the previous case. With
D thus redefined, we obtain the same verification theorem and corollary as Theorem 3.1 and
Corollary 3.1, respectively. Please refer to the previous section for details.
4.2 Solving for ψ via Duality Arguments
Through the course of our study, we determined that the optimal annuitization strategy for
the individual to minimize her probability of lifetime ruin depends on the value of p. We
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will show that when the penalty for surrendering is greater than p∗, a critical value to be
determined later, the individual will not purchase any annuity until her wealth reaches the
safe level ws(A), at which point she buys annuity income to cover the shortfall c − A. On
the other hand, if the penalty is low enough, namely p < p∗, the individual has incentive to
annuitize partially; that is, the individual purchases additional annuity to cover part of the
shortfall c−A when her wealth is strictly below the safe level. In this case, the individual will
keep some wealth to invest in the risky financial market and spend the surplus to purchase
annuity income. We solve for the minimum probability of lifetime ruin ψ for the first case
p ≥ p∗ in Section 4.2.1 and for the second case p < p∗ in Section 4.2.2. We also obtain the
corresponding optimal annuitization and investment strategies.
4.2.1 p ≥ p∗
When p ≥ p∗, we hypothesize that in the domain D\{w = ws(A) or w = 0}, the optimal
strategy for minimizing the probability of ruin is neither to purchase nor to surrender any
annuity income. Under this hypothesis, the first inequality in the HJB variational inequality
(3.9) holds with equality, and the minimum probability of ruin ψ is the solution to the
following BVP
λSψ = (rw − c+A)ψw + min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
, (4.4)
with boundary conditions
ψ(ws(A), A) = 0, (4.5)
(1− p)a¯ψw(0, A) = ψA(0, A), (4.6)
and
ψ(0, 0) = 1. (4.7)
After solving the BVP, we will show that its solution satisfies the conditions of the Verification
Theorem 3.1 to verify our hypothesis.
As in Section 3.3, we can define a related linear free-boundary problem via the Legendre
transform. Specifically, for (w,A) ∈ D, define
ψˆ(y,A) = min
w≥0
[ψ(w,A) + wy]. (4.8)
We can rewrite (4.4) as
− λSψˆ − (r − λS)yψˆy +my2ψˆyy + y(c−A) = 0. (4.9)
Its general solution is
ψˆ(y,A) = D1(A)y
B1 +D2(A)y
B2 +
c−A
r
y, (4.10)
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with B1 > 1 and B2 < 0 defined in (3.33).
Define
y0(A) = −ψw(0, A), (4.11)
and
ys(A) = −ψw(ws(A), A). (4.12)
We get from (4.6) and (4.11) thatψˆA(y0(A), A) = −(1− p)a¯y0(A),ψˆy(y0(A), A) = 0; (4.13)
from (4.5) and (4.12) that ψˆ(ys(A), A) = (c−A)a¯ys(A),ψˆy(ys(A), A) = (c−A)a¯; (4.14)
and from (4.7) and (4.11) that
ψˆ(y0(0), 0) = 1. (4.15)
Next, we determine D1(A) and D2(A) along with y0(A) and ys(A). Rewrite (4.13), (4.14),
and (4.15) using (4.10) to get
D1(A)B1y0(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2y0(A)B2−1 +
c−A
r
= 0, (4.16)
D′1(A)y0(A)
B1−1 +D′2(A)y0(A)
B2−1 =
1
r
− 1− p
r + λO
, (4.17)
D1(A)B1ys(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2ys(A)B2−1 =
c−A
r + λO
− c−A
r
, (4.18)
D1(A)ys(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)ys(A)B2−1 =
c−A
r + λO
− c−A
r
, (4.19)
D1(0)y0(0)
B1 +D2(0)y0(0)
B2 +
c
r
y0(0) = 1. (4.20)
From (4.18) and (4.19), we get
D1(A) = − 1−B2
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
(c−A) 1
ys(A)B1−1
< 0, (4.21)
D2(A) = − B1 − 1
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
(c−A) 1
ys(A)B2−1
< 0. (4.22)
Then, substitute D1(A) and D2(A) into (4.16) to get
λO
r + λO
[
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
y0(A)
ys(A)
)B1−1
+
B2(B1 − 1)
B1 −B2
(
y0(A)
ys(A)
)B2−1]
= 1. (4.23)
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It is clear that
y0(A)
ys(A)
is independent of A, and one can show that it is greater than 1 through
an argument similar to the one following (3.44). So, we define the constant
x , y0(A)
ys(A)
. (4.24)
Now, differentiate (4.21) and (4.22) with respect to A and substitute into (4.17) to get
dys(A)
dA
(c−A) λ
O
r(r + λO)
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
xB1 − xB2)
= − 1− p
r + λO
xys(A)− ys(A)
{
λO
r(r + λO)
[
1−B2
B1 −B2x
B1 +
B1 − 1
B1 −B2x
B2
]
− x
r
}
.
(4.25)
Solve (4.23) for xB2−1 to simplify (4.25) and obtain
1
ys(A)
dys(A)
dA
=
K
c−A, (4.26)
in which
K =
− B2
1−B2
1− p
r + λO
+
λO
r(r + λO)
xB1−1 − 1
r
λO
r(r + λO)
xB1−1 − 1
r
(4.27)
Define the critical value p∗ as follows:
p∗ , 1
B2
− 1−B2
B2
λO
r
(
xB1−1 − 1) . (4.28)
It is straightforward to show that K ≥ 0 iff p ≥ p∗. As we mentioned, we only consider the
case p ≥ p∗ here and leave the discussion for p < p∗ in Section 4.2.2. The expressions in
(4.24) and (4.26) imply that
y0(A) =
(
c
c−A
)K
y0(0), (4.29)
and
ys(A) =
y0(A)
x
. (4.30)
We determine the value of y0(0) by substituting (4.21) and (4.22) into (4.20):
1
y0(0)
=
c
r
[
1− λ
O
r + λO
1−B2
B1 −B2x
B1−1 − λ
O
r + λO
B1 − 1
B1 −B2x
B2−1
]
. (4.31)
By solving for xB2−1 from (4.23) and substituting it into (4.31), we get
1
y0(0)
=
c
r
(
−1−B2
B2
)(
1− λ
O
r + λO
xB1−1
)
> 0. (4.32)
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The inequality in (4.32) holds because xB1−1 <
(
r + λO
)
/λO, which is straightforward to
show from equation (4.23) and the fact that the left-hand of that equation is increasing with
respect to x. From this inequality, we conclude that both ys(A) and y0(A) are positive for
(w,A) ∈ D.
Proposition 4.1 The solution ψˆ(y,A) for the FBP (4.9) with conditions (4.13), (4.14), and
(4.15) is given by (4.10), with D1(A), D2(A), y0(0), y0(A), ys(A), x, and K defined in (4.21),
(4.22), (4.31), (4.29), (4.30), (4.23), and (4.27), respectively.
Notice that we can rewrite the inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) in terms of ψˆ as
ψˆA(y,A) ≥ − 1
r + λO
y, (4.33)
ψˆA(y,A) ≤ − 1− p
r + λO
y. (4.34)
Proposition 4.2 ψˆ(y,A) given by Proposition 4.1 is concave and satisfies inequalities (4.33)
and (4.34).
Proof: The proof of the concavity of ψˆ with respect to y follows from the observations
that both D1(A) < 0 and D2(A) < 0 and that both B1(B1 − 1) > 0 and B2(B2 − 1) > 0.
To prove the inequalities, differentiate (4.21) and (4.22) with respect to A, substitute
those expressions into ψˆA(y,A), use (4.26) to simplify, and obtain
ψˆA(y,A) = yK
λO
r(r + λO)
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[(
y
ys(A)
)B1−1
−
(
y
ys(A)
)B2−1]
+ y
{
λO
r(r + λO)
[
1−B2
B1 −B2
(
y
ys(A)
)B1−1
+
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
y
ys(A)
)B2−1]
− 1
r
}
.
(4.35)
Then, rewrite inequalities (4.33) and (4.34) in the equivalent form as
1 ≥ −Kλ
O
r
(B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[(
y
ys(A)
)B1−1
−
(
y
ys(A)
)B2−1]
− λ
O
r
[
1−B2
B1 −B2
(
y
ys(A)
)B1−1
+
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
y
ys(A)
)B2−1]
+
r + λO
r
≥ 1− p.
(4.36)
To prove (4.36), define the function g by
g(z) = −K (B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[
zB1−1 − zB2−1]− [ 1−B2
B1 −B2 z
B1−1 +
B1 − 1
B1 −B2 z
B2−1
]
.
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For z ≥ 1, g is decreasing because
g′(z) = −K (B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[
(B1 − 1)zB1−2 + (1−B2)zB2−2
]
− (B1 − 1)(1−B2)
B1 −B2
[
zB1−2 − zB2−2] ≤ 0. (4.37)
Also, the first inequality in (4.36) holds with equality when y = ys(A), and the second
inequality holds with equality when y = y0(A). Therefore, (4.36) holds for ys(A) ≤ y ≤ y0(A).

Since ψˆ is concave, we can define its convex dual via the Legendre transform:
Ψ(w,A) = max
y≥ys(A)
[
ψˆ(y,A)− wy
]
. (4.38)
As in Section 3.4, we can prove that Ψ is the minimum probability of ruin ψ, and we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 When p ≥ p∗ and the borrowing restriction is enforced, the minimum prob-
ability of ruin ψ(w,A) for (w,A) ∈ D, in which D is defined by D = {(w,A) : 0 ≤ w ≤
ws(A), 0 ≤ A < c}, is given by Ψ(w,A) in (4.38). The associated optimal annuitization and
investment strategies are given by
1. to surrender existing annuity income instantaneously to keep wealth non-negative as
needed;
2. to purchase additional annuity income only when wealth reaches ws(A), the safe level;
3. for w ∈ D\{w = ws(A)}, to invest the following amount of wealth in the risky asset:
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
ψw(w,A)
ψww(w,A)
. (4.39)
It is clear from Theorem 4.1 that the optimal annuitization strategy is independent of the
surrender charge p as long as p ≥ p∗. However, it is not clear how the optimal investment
strategy and the minimum probability of ruin vary with p. We investigate this in the next
proposition.
Proposition 4.3 pi∗(w,A) given in (4.39) is independent of the surrender charge p, and the
probability of ruin ψ(w,A) increases with respect to p.
Proof: Fix w and A. Given w, the corresponding y is defined by (4.38) as
w = ψˆy(y,A), (4.40)
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which implies that ψw(w,A) = −y and ψww(w,A) = −1/ψˆyy(y,A). Thus, we can write the
optimal investment amount as
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
yψˆyy(y,A). (4.41)
By substituting (4.10), (4.21), (4.22), (4.29), and (4.30) into (4.40) and (4.41), we get the
following two expressions, respectively:
w = D˜1(A)
[(
c−A
c
)K
y
]B1−1
+ D˜2(A)
[(
c−A
c
)K
y
]B2−1
+
c−A
r
, (4.42)
and
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
(B1 − 1)D˜1(A)
[(
c−A
c
)K
y
]B1−1
+ (B2 − 1)D˜2(A)
[(
c−A
c
)K
y
]B2−1 ,
(4.43)
in which
D˜1(A) = −B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
(c−A)
(
x
y0(0)
)B1−1
, (4.44)
D˜2(A) = −B2(B1 − 1)
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
(c−A)
(
x
y0(0)
)B2−1
. (4.45)
The numbers x and y0(0) are independent of p by (4.23) and (4.31), respectively. Thus,
D˜1(A) and D˜2(A) are also independent of p. From (4.42), we deduce that z =
(
c−A
c
)K
y,
which determines pi∗(w,A) via (4.43), does not depend on p. Indeed, differentiate (4.42) with
respect to p to obtain
0 =
[
D˜1(A)(B1 − 1)zB1−2 + D˜2(A)(B2 − 1)zB2−2
] ∂z
∂p
= ψˆyy(y,A)
x
y0(0)
∂z
∂p
.
(4.46)
Because ψˆ is strictly concave with respect to y for ys(A) ≤ y ≤ y0(A), it follows that ∂z∂p = 0,
from which we deduce that z =
(
c−A
c
)K
y is independent of p. Therefore, the optimal
investment strategy pi∗(w,A) does not depend on p.
Next, we show that ∂ψ(w,A)/∂p > 0. To this end, recall from (4.38) that
ψ(w,A) = ψˆ(y,A)− wy
=
x
y0(0)
[
D˜1(A)z
B1 + D˜2(A)z
B2
]
+
(
c−A
r
− w
)
y,
(4.47)
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in which y is given by (4.40). Differentiate this expression with respect to p to obtain
∂ψ(w,A)
∂p
=
(
c−A
r
− w
)
∂y
∂p
∝ ∂y
∂p
= − ln
(
c−A
c
)
∂K
∂p
y > 0,
(4.48)
in which we use the fact that z =
(
c−A
c
)K
y is independent of p in order to compute
∂y/∂p, and we use the definition of K in (4.27) to deduce that ∂K/∂p is positive. Thus, the
probability of ruin ψ(w,A) increases as p increases. 
Remark 4.1 Proposition 4.3 indicates that, when borrowing is restricted and p ≥ p∗, an
individual follows exactly the same investment and annuitization strategies regardless of the
value of p ≥ p∗. The individual makes her decision based on her wealth and existing annuity
income only. It is not surprising that for given values of w and A, the probability of ruin is
smaller for a smaller p because with a smaller surrender charge p, one receives more wealth
when surrendering a given amount of annuity income.
In this section, we determined the optimal annuitization and investment strategies and
the corresponding minimum probability of ruin under the condition p ≥ p∗. The latter is
equivalent to the condition K ≥ 0, which plays a critical role in the proof of Proposition 4.2. If
K were negative, then inequality (4.33) would not hold for y just above ys(A). Consequently,
Ψ(w,A) would not satisfy Condition 2 in the Verification Theorem 3.1. From this, we infer
that buying additional annuity income before reaching the safe level w = ws(A) might be
optimal when p < p∗. With this in mind, we proceed to the next section.
4.2.2 p < p∗
In this section, we consider the case for which p < p∗. Define D1 , {(w,A) : 0 ≤ w ≤
wb(A), 0 ≤ A < c} with wb(A) ∈ [0, ws(A)] to be specified later. Also, define D2 , {(w,A) :
wb(A) < w ≤ ws(A), 0 ≤ A < c}, and note that D = D1∪D2. As in the case for which p ≥ p∗
in Section 4.2.1, we only need to determine the minimum probability ψ(w,A) for (w,A) ∈ D.
We hypothesize that the following annuitization strategy is optimal: If (w,A) ∈ D1\{w =
0 or w = wb(A)}, the individual neither purchases or surrenders any life annuity income. If
(w,A) ∈ D2, the individual purchases just enough annuity income to reach the region D1.
That is to say, if she starts with (w,A) ∈ D2, the optimal strategy is to purchase ∆A of
annuity income such that w − ∆A/(r + λO) = wb(A + ∆A). Thereafter, whenever wealth
reaches the barrier wb(A), she keeps her portfolio of wealth and annuity income (w,A) in the
region D1 by instantaneously purchasing enough annuity income. On the other hand, when
wealth reaches 0, the individual instantaneously surrenders enough annuity income to keep
her wealth non-negative as we hypothesized in Section 4.2.1.
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Ruin occurs only when (w,A) = (0, 0), at which point one has no existing annuity income
to surrender to keep wealth non-negative. Under the hypothesis for the optimal annuitiza-
tion strategy, we anticipate that the associated minimum probability of ruin ψ satisfies the
following boundary-value problem. After we solve this BVP, we will verify our hypothesis
via Verification Theorem 3.1.
1. For (w,A) ∈ D1, ψ(w,A) solves the following BVP:
λSψ = (rw − c+A)ψw + min
pi
[
(µ− r)piψw + 1
2
σ2pi2ψww
]
, (4.49)
with boundary conditions
a¯ψw(wb(A), A) = ψA(wb(A), A), (4.50)
(1− p)a¯ψw(0, A) = ψA(0, A), (4.51)
and
ψ(0, 0) = 1. (4.52)
2. For (w,A) ∈ D2 , we have
ψ(w,A) = ψ
(
w − ∆A
r + λO
, A+ ∆A
)
, (4.53)
in which w−∆A/(r+λO) = wb(A+∆A). Notice that (w−∆A/(r+λO), A+∆A) ∈ D1,
and thus ψ(w −∆A/(r + λO), A+ ∆A) is determined by the BVP (4.49)-(4.52).
3. To solve for ψ in the entire region D, as well as to determine the purchase boundary
wb(A), we also rely on a smooth fit condition across the boundary wb(A), namely,
a¯ψww(wb(A), A) = ψwA(wb(A), A). (4.54)
We first consider ψ(w,A) in the region D1 by solving the related BVP (4.49)-(4.52).
Hypothesize that ψ is convex with respect to w, and define its concave dual via the Legendre
transform by
ψˆ(y,A) = min
w≥0
[ψ(w,A) + wy] . (4.55)
As before, rewrite (4.49) as
− λSψˆ − (r − λS)yψˆy +my2ψˆyy + y(c−A) = 0. (4.56)
Its general solution is
ψˆ(y,A) = D1(A)y
B1 +D2(A)y
B2 +
c−A
r
y, (4.57)
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in which B1 > 1 and B2 < 0 are defined in (3.33). Define
y0(A) = −ψw(0, A), (4.58)
and
yb(A) = −ψw(wb(A), A). (4.59)
We get the following free-boundary conditions from (4.50), (4.51), (4.52), (4.58), and (4.59):ψˆA(y0(A), A) = −(1− p)a¯y0(A),ψˆy(y0(A), A) = 0; (4.60)ψˆA(yb(A), A) = −a¯yb(A),ψˆy(yb(A), A) = wb(A); (4.61)
and
ψˆ(y0(0), 0) = 1. (4.62)
The smooth fit condition on the boundary w = wb(A) implies
ψˆAy(yb(A), A) = −a¯. (4.63)
Use (4.57) to rewrite (4.60), (4.61), (4.62), and (4.63) as follows:
D1(A)B1y0(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2y0(A)B2−1 +
c−A
r
= 0, (4.64)
D′1(A)y0(A)
B1−1 +D′2(A)y0(A)
B2−1 =
1
r
− 1− p
r + λO
, (4.65)
D1(A)B1yb(A)
B1−1 +D2(A)B2yb(A)B2−1 +
c−A
r
= wb(A), (4.66)
D′1(A)yb(A)
B1−1 +D′2(A)yb(A)
B2−1 =
1
r
− 1
r + λO
, (4.67)
D1(0)y0(0)
B1 +D2(0)y0(0)
B2 +
c
r
y0(0) = 1, (4.68)
D′1(A)B1yb(A)
B1−1 +D′2(A)B2yb(A)
B2−1 =
1
r
− 1
r + λO
. (4.69)
Solve (4.64) and (4.66) for D1(A) and D2(A):
D1(A) =
1
B1
yb(A)
1−B1 1
xB1−B2 − 1
[
−wb(A) + c−A
r
(
1− x1−B2)] , (4.70)
D2(A) =
1
B2
yb(A)
1−B2 1
xB2−B1 − 1
[
−wb(A) + c−A
r
(
1− x1−B1)] , (4.71)
in which
x , y0(A)
yb(A)
. (4.72)
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Recall that wb(A) is to be determined. We solve for D
′
1(A) and D
′
2(A) from (4.67) and (4.69)
to get:
D′1(A) =
λO
r(r + λO)
1−B2
B1 −B2 yb(A)
1−B1 , (4.73)
D′2(A) =
λO
r(r + λO)
B1 − 1
B1 −B2 yb(A)
1−B2 . (4.74)
By substituting (4.73) and (4.74) into (4.65), we get
1−B2
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
xB1−1 +
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
λO
r(r + λO)
xB2−1 =
1
r
− 1− p
r + λO
, (4.75)
which has a unique solution for x > 1; the argument is similar to the corresponding one in
Section 3.3 for the solution of (3.44). It is clear from (4.75) that x is independent of A.
Differentiate D1(A) and D2(A) in (4.70) and (4.71) with respect to A to get a second
expression for D′1(A) and D′2(A); set equal the two expressions for each of D′1(A) and D′2(A)
to get
dyb(A)/dA
yb(A)
=
λO
r(r + λO)
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
xB1−B2 − 1)+ w′b(A) + 1r (1− x1−B2)
(1−B1)
[
−wb(A) + c−A
r
(1− x1−B2)
] , (4.76)
dyb(A)/dA
yb(A)
=
λO
r(r + λO)
B2(B1 − 1)
B1 −B2
(
xB2−B1 − 1)+ w′b(A) + 1r (1− x1−B1)
(1−B2)
[
−wb(A) + c−A
r
(1− x1−B1)
] . (4.77)
Set equal the right-hand sides of the two equations above to get a non-linear ODE for wb(A):
α1(c−A)w′b(A) + α2wb(A) + α3w′b(A)wb(A) + α4(c−A) = 0, (4.78)
in which
α1 = −1
r
[
(B1 − 1)
(
1− x1−B2)+ (1−B2) (1− x1−B1)] ,
α2 = (B1 − 1)
[
λO
r(r + λO)
(B1 − 1)B2
B1 −B2
(
xB2−B1 − 1)+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)]
+(1−B2)
[
λO
r(r + λO)
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
xB1−B2 − 1)+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)] ,
α3 = B1 −B2 > 0,
α4 = −1
r
{
(B1 − 1)
[
λO
r(r + λO)
(B1 − 1)B2
B1 −B2
(
xB2−B1 − 1)+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)] (1− x1−B2)
+(1−B2)
[
λO
r(r + λO)
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
xB1−B2 − 1)+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)] (1− x1−B1)} .
(4.79)
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Also, we have the boundary condition wb(c−) = 0 because 0 ≤ wb(A) ≤ ws(A) for all
0 ≤ A < c and ws(c−) = 0. A solution of the ODE, together with the boundary condition at
A = c, is given by
wb(A) = b · (c−A), (4.80)
in which
b =
(α2 − α1) +
√
(α2 − α1)2 + 4α3α4
2α3
. (4.81)
Note that this solution for the purchase boundary wb(A) is linear with respect to A.
From the expression on the right-hand side of (4.76) and from (4.80), define
K ,
λO
r(r + λO)
B1(1−B2)
B1 −B2
(
xB1−B2 − 1)− b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)
(1−B1)
[
−b+ 1
r
(1− x1−B2)
] . (4.82)
Solve (4.76) and (4.72) to obtain
y0(A) =
(
c
c−A
)K
y0(0), (4.83)
and
yb(A) =
y0(A)
x
. (4.84)
To finish solving the FBP, we substitue (4.70), (4.71), and (4.80) into (4.68) to get
1
y0(0)
=
c
B1
xB1−1
xB1−B2 − 1
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)]+ c
B2
xB2−1
xB2−B1 − 1
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)]+ c
r
.
(4.85)
Proposition 4.4 The solution of the FBP (4.56) with conditions (4.60), (4.61), and (4.62)
is given by (4.57), with D1(A), D2(A), y0(0), y0(A), yb(A), x, and K defined in (4.70),
(4.71), (4.85), (4.83), (4.84), (4.75), and (4.82), respectively.
Notice that we can rewrite the inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) in terms of ψˆ as
ψˆA(y,A) ≥ − 1
r + λO
y, (4.86)
ψˆA(y,A) ≤ − 1− p
r + λO
y. (4.87)
Next, we prove that ψˆ is concave with respect to y and satisfies inequalities (4.86) and (4.87).
Proposition 4.5 ψˆ(y,A) given by Proposition 4.4 is concave with respect to y and satisfies
inequalities (4.86) and (4.87).
Proof: The proof that ψˆ is concave with respect to y is not obvious (unlike the previous
two cases), so we relegate that (long) proof to the Appendix.
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Substitute D′1(A)yB1 +D′2(A)yB2 −
y
r
for ψˆA(y,A) to rewrite the inequalities (4.86) and
(4.87) in the equivalent form as
− 1 ≤ λ
O
r
[
1−B2
B1 −B2
(
y
yb(A)
)B1−1
+
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
y
yb(A)
)B2−1]
− r + λ
O
r
≤ −(1− p). (4.88)
To prove the inequality above, define
h(z) =
1−B2
B1 −B2 z
B1−1 +
B1 − 1
B1 −B2 z
B2−1, (4.89)
and note that
h′(z) =
(1−B2)(B1 − 1)
B1 −B2
[
zB1−2 − zB2−2] ≥ 0, z ≥ 1. (4.90)
Also, the first inequality in (4.88) holds with equality when y = yb(A), and the second
inequality holds with equality when y = y0(A). Thus, because h(z) is non-decreasing for
z ≥ 1, inequality (4.88) holds for yb(A) 6 y 6 y0(A). 
As before, we define the convex dual of ψˆ via the Legendre transform for (w,A) ∈ D1 as
Ψ(w,A) = max
y≥yb(A)
[
ψˆ(y,A)− wy
]
. (4.91)
For (w,A) ∈ D2, we define
Ψ(w,A) = Ψ(w − a¯∆A,A+ ∆A), (4.92)
in which ∆A solves w − a¯∆A = b(c − (A + ∆A)); that is, ∆A = w − b(c−A)
a¯− b . Notice that
since (w − a¯∆A,A+ ∆A) ∈ D1, Ψ(w − a¯∆A,A+ ∆A) is given through (4.91).
Now we proceed to the following lemma, which demonstrates that Ψ is the minimum
probability of ruin by Verification Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 4.1 Ψ(w,A) defined in (4.91) and (4.92) satisfies Conditions 1-4 of the Verification
Theorem 3.1.
Proof: First, consider (w,A) ∈ D1. In terms of Ψ(w,A), we rewrite (4.56) as follows:
λSΨ(w,A) = (rw − c)Ψw(w,A)−m Ψ
2
w(w,A)
Ψww(w,A)
, (4.93)
as well as (4.86) and (4.87)
a¯Ψw(w,A) ≤ ΨA(w,A), (4.94)
(1− p)a¯Ψw(w,A) ≥ ΨA(w,A). (4.95)
Expressions (4.93)-(4.95) show that Ψ(w,A) satisfies Conditions 1-3 of the Verification The-
orem 3.1 on D1. It is clear by construction that Ψ satisfies Condition 4, namely, Ψ(0, 0) = 1.
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Now, consider (w,A) ∈ D2. By definition,
Ψ(w,A) = Ψ(w′, A′), (4.96)
with w′ = w − w − b(c−A)
1− b/a¯ and A
′ = A+
w − b(c−A)
a¯− b . From (4.96), we get the following
relations
Ψw(w,A) = − b
a¯− b Ψw(w
′, A′) +
1
a¯− b ΨA(w
′, A′), (4.97)
Ψww(w,A) =
(
b
a¯− b
)2
Ψww(w
′, A′)− 2b
(a¯− b)2 ΨwA(w,A) +
(
1
a¯− b
)2
ΨAA(w
′, A′), (4.98)
and
ΨA(w,A) = − ba¯
a¯− b Ψw(w
′, A′) +
a¯
a¯− b ΨA(w
′, A′). (4.99)
Since (w′, A′) is on the boundary w = wb(A), we have
a¯Ψw(w
′, A′) = ΨA(w′, A′). (4.100)
This along with (4.97) leads to
Ψw(w,A) = Ψw(w
′, A′). (4.101)
Differentiate (4.101) with respect to w to get
Ψww(w,A) = − b
a¯− b Ψww(w
′, A′) +
1
a¯− b ΨwA(w
′, A′). (4.102)
From (4.102) and from the smooth fit condition on the purchase boundary, namely
a¯Ψww(w
′, A′) = ΨwA(w′, A′), (4.103)
we obtain
Ψww(w,A) = Ψww(w
′, A′). (4.104)
We know that for (w′, A′) ∈ D1 and for pi ∈ R,
LpiΨ(w′, A′) = [rw′ + (µ− r)pi − c+A′]Ψw(w′, A′) + 1
2
σ2pi2Ψww(w
′, A′)− λSΨ(w′, A′) ≥ 0.
(4.105)
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It follows that for (w,A) ∈ D2,
LpiΨ(w,A) =
[
r
(
w′ +
w − b(c−A)
1− b/a¯
)
+ (µ− r)pi − c+
(
A′ − w − b(c−A)
a¯− b
)]
Ψw(w
′, A′)
+
1
2
σ2pi2Ψww(w
′, A′)− λS Ψ(w′, A′)
=LpiΨ(w′, A′) +
[
r
w − b(c−A)
1− b/a¯ −
w − b(c−A)
a¯− b
]
Ψw(w
′, A′) ≥ 0,
(4.106)
because LpiΨ(w′, A′) ≥ 0, Ψw(w′, A′) ≤ 0, and r w − b(c−A)
1− b/a¯ −
w − b(c−A)
a¯− b ≤ 0. Thus,
Ψ(w,A) satisfies Condition 1 of the Verification Theorem for (w,A) ∈ D2.
Next, consider Conditions 2 and 3 for (w,A) ∈ D2. From (4.97) and (4.99), Condition 2
holds for (w,A) if and only if
a¯
[
− b
a¯− b Ψw(w
′, A′) +
1
a¯− b ΨA(w
′, A′)
]
≤ − ba¯
a¯− b Ψw(w
′, A′)+
a¯
a¯− b ΨA(w
′, A′), (4.107)
which is true with equality. Thus, we conclude that Condition 2 holds with equality for
(w,A) ∈ D2. Finally, because 0 < p < p∗ ≤ 1, Ψw ≤ 0, and ΨA ≤ 0, it follows that Condition
3 also holds on D2. 
Therefore, Ψ(w,A) is the minimum probability of ruin by the Verification Theorem 3.1,
and we present the following theorem that summarizes the work of this section.
Theorem 4.2 When p < p∗ and the borrowing restriction is enforced, the minimum proba-
bility of ruin for (w,A) ∈ D = D1 ∪ D2, with D1 = {(w,A) : 0 ≤ w ≤ wb(A), 0 ≤ A < c}
and D2 = {(w,A) : wb(A) < w < ws(A), 0 ≤ A < c}, is given by Ψ(w,A) defined above. The
associated optimal strategy is:
1. to purchase additional annuity income so that wealth and annuity income lie on the
boundary w = b · (c−A) of the region D1 when (w,A) ∈ D2;
2. to purchase additional annuity income instantaneously to keep (w,A) in the region D1
when w = wb(A);
3. to surrender exisiting annuity income instantaneously to keep w non-negative when
needed;
4. to invest in the risky asset with amount
pi∗(w,A) = −µ− r
σ2
Ψw(w,A)
Ψww(w,A)
,
when (w,A) ∈ D1.
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4.3 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to demonstrate the results of Section 4.2.1
and 4.2.2. The basic scenario is the same as in Section 3.5, and we focus on the role of the
surrender penalty p.
4.3.1 p ≥ p∗
Figures 6-9 show the ruin probabilities and associated optimal investment strategies when
p ≥ p∗. We fix all the parameters except for annuity income A and surrender penalty p. Note
that the smallest p value of the selected is 0.258, which is the value of p∗ for the scenario we
chose. The boundary w = 0 and ws does not depend on p. Therefore, for each figure, all four
curves have the same domain. By showing the ruin probabilities and investment strategies
for different A and p, we see some common patterns as well as the effect of p. Within each
figure, the probabilities of ruin are decreasing and convex. On the surrender boundary w = 0,
the curves of the ruin probabilities begin with different values, not necessarily 0. This occurs
because if the individual has some annuity income, she surrenders some of it to avoid ruin
when reaching that boundary. We also observe that bigger p results in higher probability of
ruin. This is consistent with the financial intuition that an individual receives less wealth
from surrendering annuity income when the penalty p is bigger, as we also show in Proposition
4.3.
If A is not 0, reversibility makes difference in the ruin probability on the boundary w = 0,
and consequently on the whole ruin probability curve. Reversibility of the annuity offers an
extra chance to avoid bankrupcty. This is demonstrated by the difference of ruin probabilities
between p = 0.258 and p = 1 for given values of (w,A). Note that at w = 0, the difference
increases dramatically as A increases. When A = 0, both ruin probabilities are 1. On the
other hand, when A = 0.75, the individual with the reversible annuity (p = 0.258) has
only about a 25% chance to ruin when her wealth is 0 if she follows the optimal strategy.
By contrast, if the annuity is irreversible (p = 1), she ruins immediately when wealth is 0
because the annuity is effectively worthless. This gap in the ruin probabilities shrinks as
wealth w increases, and the ruin probabilities associated with different p’s converge to 0 at
w = ws(A), the safe level.
The interesting phenomenon that the investment in the risky asset does not depend on
p is demonstrated in all figures, as we also show in Proposition 4.3. This indicates that the
individual invests in the risky asset as if the annuity is irreversible when p ≥ p∗. That is, we
see a type of separation result: optimal investment in the risky asset is independent of the
optimal annuitization strategy when p ≥ p∗.
4.3.2 p < p∗
Figures 10-13 show the ruin probabilities and associated optimal investment strategies when
p < p∗. Recall from Section 4.2.2 that it is optimal to purchase immediate life annuities
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before wealth reaches the safe level. Note that the largest value of p we can choose is 0.258.
It is natural to believe that one’s behavior changes smoothly as penalty p changes. This
belief is confirmed in these figures. By observing the curves associated with p = 0.258 in
Figures 6-9 and in Figures 10-13, we conclude that the optimal investment strategies and ruin
probabilities from the two different sets of equations are the same. (We can also demonstrate
this fact algebraically, but in the interest of space, we omit that computation.)
We see that the ruin probabilities in Figures 10-13 are all decreasing and convex. The
wealth domain for a given function in these figures is [0, b · (c−A)], and note that b decreases
as p decreases because for a smaller surrender charge, the individual has more incentive to
annuitize at a lower wealth level. It remains true that, with all else equal, a smaller surrender
charge p results in a smaller probability of ruin. Also, note that investment in risky asset
increases as wealth increases, as in the case for which p ≥ p∗. However, different from what
we see for p ≥ p∗ case, the investment strategy is no longer independent of p. More cash
is invested in the risky asset if one can get a larger portion of her annuity value back by
surrendering.
Figure 14 demonstrates the relation between b and the proportional surrender penalty p.
The sign ∗ in the figure indicates the b value of 1
r + λO
. We see that b increases monotonically
and continuously from 0 to
1
r + λO
as p increases from 0 to p∗, as we expect.
5 Conclusion
The annuity puzzle has been widely noted both in practice and in theoretical work; see
Milevsky and Young [2007] and Milevsky et al. [2006] and the references therein. In this
paper, we considered a financial innovation that might encourage more retirees to purchase
immediate life annuities, namely the option to surrender one’s annuity for cash. We ex-
plained the relation between the irreversibility of annuitization and the retirees’ reluctance
to purchase. We investigated how reversibility would affect the decision of a retiree seeking to
minimize her lifetime probability of ruin. We analyzed the optimal investment and annuiti-
zation strategies for such a retiree when borrowing against the surrender value of the annuity
is prohibited. We found that the individuals annuity purchasing strategy depends on the
size of the proportional surrender charge. When the charge is large enough, the individual
will not buy a life annuity unless she can cover all her consumption, the so-called safe level.
When the charge is small enough, the individual will buy a life annuity at a wealth lower
than this safe level. In both cases, the individual only surrenders annuity income in order to
keep her wealth non-negative.
These results confirm the point of view in Gardner and Wadsworth [2004] that the lack
of flexibility discourages retirees from purchasing immediate life annuities. In our model, if
annuities are irreversible, then retirees will buy annuities only when their wealth reaches the
safe level. Moreover, we showed that if annuities are reversible, then a retiree will partially
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annuitize if the surrender charge is low enough. In numerical examples, we noticed that
the threshold value of surrender charge for an individual to consider partial annuitization
might be too low for annuity providers. This perhaps explains why reversible immediate life
annuities are not offered in the annuity market.
The model in this paper offers a mathematical framework to understand the annuity
puzzle. Even though we assumed constant hazard rates and interest rate in our analysis,
we believe that the main qualitative insight will be true in general and will be useful to
develop better structured annuity products for retirees. Our analysis also implies that a well
developed secondary market of annuities would benefit both potential annuity buyers and
providers.
6 Appendix
In this appendix, we prove that the ψˆ given in Proposition 4.4 is concave thereby completing
the proof of Proposition 4.5.
Take the second derivative of (4.57) with respect to y to get
ψˆyy(y,A) = D1(A)B1(B1 − 1)yB1−2 +D2(A)B2(B2 − 1)yB2−2. (6.1)
We want to show that ψˆyy(y,A) ≤ 0 for yb(A) ≤ y ≤ y0(A). Substitute (4.70) and (4.71) into
(6.1), and define z , y/yb(A) ∈ [1, x], with x defined by (4.72). Then, we get
ψˆyy(y,A) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ (B1 − 1)
[
y
yb(A)
]B1−B2 1
xB1−B2 − 1
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)]
+ (1−B2) x
B1−B2
xB1−B2 − 1
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)] ≤ 0
⇐⇒ (B1 − 1)
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)] ( z
x
)B1−B2
+ (1−B2)
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)] ≤ 0.
(6.2)
Note that B1 − 1 > 0 and xB2−1 < 1. It follows that
(B1 − 1)
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)] < 0. (6.3)
Hence the left-hand side of the last inequality in (6.2) reaches its maximum value when z = 1.
So, to prove that ψˆ is concave with respect to y, it is sufficient to show that
(B1 − 1)
[
−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B2)]xB2−1 + (1−B2) [−b+ 1
r
(
1− x1−B1)]xB1−1 ≤ 0. (6.4)
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Solve for xB2−1 from (4.75); then, substitute into (6.4), which becomes
(B1 − 1)
[(
1
r
− b
)
B1 −B2
B1 − 1
λO + pr
λO
−
(
1
r
− b
)
1−B2
B1 − 1x
B1−1 − 1
r
]
+ (1−B2)
[(
1
r
− b
)
xB1−1 − 1
r
]
≤ 0
⇐⇒
(
1
r
− b
)
(B1 −B2)λ
O + pr
λO
− 1
r
(B1 −B2) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ b ≥ p
λO + pr
.
(6.5)
Therefore, if we show that b ≥ p/(λO + pr), then we are done. To this end, note that
b ≥ p
λO + pr
⇐⇒ 2α3
r
(
1− λ
O
λO + pr
)
− (α2 − α1) ≤
√
(α2 − α1)2 + 4α3α4, (6.6)
in which the αi are given in (4.79) for i = 1, . . . , 4. The second inequality above holds
automatically if its left-hand side is less than or equal to 0. Thus, suppose that the left-hand
side is positive, and square both sides to get that b ≥ p/(λO + pr) holds if
α4 +
1
r
(
1− λ
O
λO + pr
)
(α2 − α1)− α3
r
(
1− λ
O
λO + pr
)2
≥ 0. (6.7)
By substituting for the αi, i = 1, . . . , 4, by substituting for λ
O/(λO + pr) via the following
expression from (4.75)
λO
λO + pr
=
(B1 −B2)x1−B1x1−B2
(B1 − 1)x1−B1 + (1−B2)x1−B2 , (6.8)
and by simplifying carefully, we learn that (6.7) is equivalent to
0 ≤ λ
O
λO + pr
− λ
O
λO + r
, (6.9)
which is true because 0 < p ≤ 1. We have proved that b ≥ p/(λO + pr) and, thereby, that ψˆ
is concave with respect to y.
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Figure 1: The region for solving minimum probability of ruin when borrowing against annuity
is allowed
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Figure 2: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0
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Figure 3: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.25
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Figure 4: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.5
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Figure 5: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.75
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Figure 6: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0
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Figure 7: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.25
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Figure 8: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.5
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Figure 9: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.75
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Figure 10: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0
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Figure 11: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.25
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Figure 12: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.5
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Figure 13: Ruin probabilities and optimal investment strategies for different p when A is 0.75
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Figure 14: value of b with different p
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